University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2007

Posner on Beanie Babies
William M. Landes

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
William M. Landes, "Posner on Beanie Babies," 74 University of Chicago Law Review 1761 (2007).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

Posner on Beanie Babies
William M. Landest

Cuddly, stuffed toy animals and Richard Posner might seem a
strange combination. But maybe not, for Posner has a soft spot for
small animals (but not dogs) and in addition to being an ardent fan of
monkeys, describes himself as "slavishly devoted" to his cat Dinah.' So
what could be more fun for a judge who likes small animals, finds intellectual property a challenging area for economics, and views writing
as a form of consumption, not work (unlike the rest of us), than authoring one copyright and three trademark opinions in a three-year
period involving Ty's pellet-filled plush toy animals called "Beanie
Babies"? In the copyright case, Posner held that a collector's guide
containing photographs of every released Beanie Baby did 2 not infringe the copyrights on Beanie Babies as sculptural works. In the
trademark cases, Posner found that (1) a seller of second-hand Beanie
Babies using the business name Bargain Beanies and the domain
name "bargainbeanies.com" did not violate the federal antidilution
statute;' (2) the personal name rule (which requires that a personal
name achieve "secondary meaning" before it will be protected as a
trademark) did not apply to a toy camel named "Niles;" and (3) there
was insufficient evidence on likelihood of confusion to find that the
mark "Screenie Beanies" attached to a soft stuffed toy animal used for
wiping computer screens
infringed Ty's trademark for purposes of
5
summary judgment.
Not surprisingly, I find myself in complete agreement with the
four decisions, since my views on copyright and trademarks are thoroughly intertwined with Posner's after having jointly authored numerous articles and a book on the economics of intellectual property law.
My intention here, therefore, is to look more closely at a fascinating
economic and legal question that arises in the Perryman case: whether
t

Clifton R. Musser Professor of Law & Economics at The University of Chicago Law

School.

1 Larissa Macfarquhar, The Bench Burner: How Did a Judge with such Subversive Ideas
Become a Leading Influence on American Legal Opinion?,The New Yorker 78 (Dec 10, 2001).
2
Ty, Inc v PublicationsInternationalLtd, 292 F3d 512, 516, 519, 522-23 (7th Cir 2002). This
case also involved a trademark infringement claim that was not brought before the appellate court.
3 Ty, Inc v Perryman,306 F3d 509,513-14 (7th Cir 2002).
4
PeaceablePlanet,Inc v Ty, Inc, 362 F3d 986,990 (7th Cir 2004).
5
Ty, Inc v Softbelly's, Inc, 353 F3d 528,535 (7th Cir 2003).
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a reseller of goods in varying conditions (or, for simplicity, "secondhand" goods, even though some of the goods may be in pristine or
new condition) who uses the original trademark to identify and promote the goods it sells (for example, a seller of used Fords who advertises and promotes the goods as used "Ford" automobiles) can dilute
the trademark on the original good.
Ty began selling Beanie Babies in 1993. Beanies were designed
with minimal detail, used basic colors, were easy to pose, had a heartshaped tag attached that indicated the Beanie's name and birth date,
and were priced in the $5 to $10 range. Ty obtained several federal
trademark registrations for variations of the BEANIE BABY mark.
The collectors' craze for Beanies, however, did not begin until Ty retired the nine original Beanies in 1997. Although Ty has produced
over 800 types of Beanies since 1993, its marketing strategy of producing each type in limited quantities helped transform Beanies from a
commodity to a collectible and helped create a secondary market. As
Posner explains:
Ty deliberately produces a quantity of each Beanie Baby that
fails to clear the market at the very low price that it charges for
Beanie Babies. The main goal is to stampede children into nagging their parents to buy the new Baby lest they be the only kid
on the block who doesn't have it. A byproduct (or perhaps additional goal) is the creation of a secondary market, like the secondary market in works of art, in which prices on scarce Beanie
Babies are bid up to a market-clearing level.
I would add free advertising and publicity as advantageous byproducts
of Ty's limited supply strategy, which generates news stories and wordof-mouth advertising about the "shortage" of newly released Beanies.
Today, second-hand Beanie Babies are sold on eBay.com and other
websites. A glance at eBay.com reveals that a few "rare" Beanies sell for
more than $1000. Perryman started selling retired and used Beanies in
the secondary marked in 1997 under the business name "bargain beanies" and domain name "bargainbeanies.com." After Perryman .refused
Ty's request to stop using the term Beanies in both her business and
domain name, Ty filed a lawsuit in 1999 alleging trademark infringement, unfair competition and dilution under the Lanham Act. Perryman
argued unsuccessfully that the term Beanies was either a generic or
descriptive term without secondary meaning and, therefore, she was
free to use the term to identify her business and the products she sold.
6

7

Perryman, 306 F3d at 512-13.
Ty, Inc v Perryman, 2001 US Dist LEXIS 10303 at *29-31.
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The lower court found that Beanie Babies was a protectible mark,
granted summary judgment in favor of Ty on the dilution claim and
enjoined Perryman from using "BEANIE or BEANIES or any colorable imitation thereof ... within any business name, Internet domain

name, or trademark." On appeal, Posner reversed the dilution claim
and vacated the injunction. Posner reasoned that:
[The resale or secondary] market is unlikely to operate efficiently
if sellers who specialize in serving it cannot use "Beanies" to
identify their business. Perryman's principal merchandise is
Beanie Babies, so that to forbid it to use "Beanies" in its business
name and advertising (Web or otherwise) is like forbidding a
used car dealer who specializes in selling Chevrolets to mention
the name in his advertising.
Dilution, however, may still occur even if there are offsetting
benefits in the operation of the secondary market in Beanies. Stated
differently, the question still remains whether the benefits from finding dilution more than offset the harm imposed on the operation of
the secondary market.
I. TRADEMARK DILUTION

Traditionally, trademark infringement requires a likelihood of
confusion between the plaintiff's (A) and defendant's (B) marks. This
follows from the basic rationale for trademark protection. Trademarks
reduce search costs by providing consumers relevant information on
attributes of goods and services they buy. Consider the trademark (or,
equivalently, brand name) CREST for toothpaste. The information
associated with the mark (e.g., favorable past experiences) would be
compromised if another toothpaste manufacturer uses a trademark
that is confusingly similar to the CREST mark. Instead of simply
reaching for the toothpaste labeled CREST, a consumer would have
to take the time and effort to read the fine print and inspect the packaging to make sure he was getting the Proctor & Gamble's CREST
and not another toothpaste with a confusingly similar mark. Higher
information costs would also result, for example, if a firm called its
mouthwash CREST because many consumers would believe that the
mouthwash was manufactured by or connected to (e.g., an approved
licensee of) Proctor & Gamble. Not only are consumers injured by a
confusingly similar mark but so is the owner of the mark. Proctor &
8
See Perryman, 306 F3d at 510. The injunction also forbade Perryman from using the
Beanie mark or colorable imitation in connection with non-Ty products.
9 Id at 513.
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Gamble would have less incentive to invest in developing and maintaining its mark and producing consistently high quality toothpaste if
another firm used a confusingly similar mark.
Dilution is different. Dilution starts with the assumption that
there is no likelihood of confusion. Consumers correctly perceive, for
example, that there is no connection between the company that manufactures Cartier watches and say a restaurant called Pizzeria Cartier.
Yet Cartier jewelry is so well known that the pizzeria's use will create
a mental association between the restaurant and the jewelry manufacturer that, in some circumstances, may dilute the selling power of the
Cartier mark. Before we consider more carefully the harm from dilution, we first summarize briefly the federal dilution statute.
A. The Statute
The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 199510 is now H§ 43(c)
and 45 of the Lanham Act. The stated purpose of the statute is to protect famous marks against another firm using a substantially similar
mark that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or tarnishment even
though in the given context there is no likelihood of confusion or
competition between the parties. According to the statute, blurring
"impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark" while tarnishment
"harms the reputation of the famous mark."" Thus, a defendant cannot avoid liability for dilution (as it may be able to when liability turns
on likelihood of confusion) by adding a disclaimer that it is in no way
affiliated with, connected to or sponsored by the firm the owns the famous mark. In principle, therefore, dilution greatly expands the property rights accorded a trademark owner, because these rights no longer
depend on showing a likelihood of confusion. These rights, however, are
not absolute, for §43(c)(3) includes three exceptions to dilution: fair use
of a famous mark in comparative advertising and parodies; news reporting and news commentary; and noncommercial uses.
Dilution requires that the plaintiffs mark be famous. Only then
will the mark retain its source significance when encountered outside
the usual context of the goods or services in which the mark is used.
For example, if someone advertises its health club as the Rolls Royce
of health clubs, it will be understood that the term "Rolls Royce" implies a very expensive and exclusive health club. The statute defines a
10

Pub L No 104-98, 109 Stat 985, codified at 15 USC §§ 1125, 1127 (2000).
11 See the revised subsections 43(c)(2)(B) and (C), Trademark Dilution Revision Act, Pub L
No 109-312, 120 Stat 1730 (2006), to be codified at 15 USC § 1125(c)(2), that were enacted in 2006
in an act to amend the Trademark Act of 1946 with respect to dilution by blurring or tamishment.
12 120 Stat at 1731.
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famous mark as one that "is widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods
or services of the mark's owner."' Dilution also requires that the defendant's mark be substantially similar or even identical to the plaintiff's mark. Since the plaintiff and defendant's goods are often dissimilar (otherwise ordinary confusion is likely), substantial similarity is
necessary for the defendant's mark to call to mind the plaintiff's mark.
B.

The Economics of Dilution

Assume that a firm's sales depend on its trademark in three ways.
First, the firm's trademark lowers information and search costs, which
increase the demand for the firm's product. This increase in demand
will increase the price the consumer pays or the firm's sales or both
because the product becomes more valuable to consumers. Second,
the firm's trademark symbolizes its image or the "face" it presents to
the public. This image will depend on the quality of the firm's product,
its advertising (including the reputation of celebrities who promote
and use the product), the status, income and prestige of persons who
consume the product, and so forth. The firm's image also affects the
position of its demand curve-the more favorable its image, other
things the same, the greater its sales independent of the information
economizing effect of trademarks. Firms aggressively try to protect
their image, which suggests that a positive "image" is a valuable intangible asset that generates greater sales and profits. Indeed, marketing
and sales personnel stress the connection between trademarks and
image, not the reduction in information costs that is central to the
economic approach to trademarks. Finally, some well-known trademarks generate licensing revenues to the firm. For example, famous
clothing designers frequently license their marks for use in ancillary
products, such as eyeglasses and perfume.
Equation (1) summarizes the roles of a firm's trademark (T) in
providing information about the firm's product and symbolizing its
image.
(1) P = Po+ al(T,z) +/3M(T, z)

13
Id. Prior to the 2006 Act it was unclear whether fame in a niche market as opposed to
fame to the public at large satisfied the "famous" requirement. From an economic standpoint,
fame in the niche market could be sufficient, provided the defendant's use focuses on a sufficient
number of consumers in that niche market. See Times MirrorMagazines,Inc v Las Vegas Sports
News, 212 F3d 157, 165 (3d Cir 2000) (holding that the district court did not commit error by
characterizing a mark as "famous" because the mark bore a "high degree of distinctiveness" for a
niche market in which both litigants operated).
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In equation (1) P denotes the full price consumers are willing to
pay for the good; Po is the price if the firm provides no or minimal information about its product and has an image that contributes nothing
of value (that is, a "zero" image); I denotes information the firm provides that reduces consumer search costs; M denotes the firm's image,
which adds value to its product when M is positive and subtracts value
when M is negative; and a and /8 transform units of information and
image into dollars. We assume further that I and M are positive and
decreasing functions of the strength of the firm's trademark T and P is
independent of the firm's output X.14 To be sure, other factors (z) such
as product quality, advertising and promotion, celebrities who use the
product, newspaper stories, management scandals, and so forth also
influence I and M, but here we focus on the role of trademarks and
take as given the influence of all other factors.
We can write the firm's net profits 7 as
(2) r= [Po+ al(T,z) +/JM(T,z)]X+ L(T)- C(X, T)
where r includes revenue (L) the firm expects from licensing its
trademark and nets out the firm's cost C. We assume that C is a positive and increasing functions of X and T (that is, marginal cost is positive and increasing in both T and X). The firm will select values for T
and X that maximize its profits, which yield
(3) [Po+ a(T,z) +/3M(T, z)] - C, = 0
(4)

(,

+ JM,)X + L, - C, = 0

.

Equation (3) is the usual profit-maximizing condition that equates
price (holding T constant) and marginal cost. Notice that the relevant
price in (3) is the full price P, which will be higher, the greater the
strength of the firm's trademark (and, therefore, the lower the consumer search costs and the more favorable the firm's image). From (3)
it follows that the higher P is, the greater the firm's output X will be.
Equation (4) defines the firm's optimal expenditures on its trademark.
These expenditures will be greater, the greater the marginal product
of its trademark in lowering search costs (al), enhancing its image
(I8M,), and generating licensing revenues (L,). Note also that the equilibrium level of T will be greater, the greater the firm's output (for the
marginal gains al, and IM, are weighted by X) and the lower the
14 We assume the firm is a price taker in the sense that the demand curve it faces is infinitely elastic at P. but it can obtain a higher price as it provides more information and its image
becomes more favorable. This model is essentially the one in William M. Landes and Richard A.
Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law 174-79 (Belknap Press 2003), with

the addition of the impact of the firm's image and licensing revenues (both of which depend on
the strength of the firm's trademark) on revenues and profits.
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marginal cost (CT) of developing and strengthening its trademark. The
profit maximizing values of X and T are determined simultaneously
since X depends on T and T on X.
In a typical trademark infringement suit, the plaintiff A must
show that the similarity between A's and the defendant B's marks
makes consumers likely to think that B is selling A's brand (that is,
passing off) or that A has sponsored, approved or licensed B's product. In terms of equation (4), a likelihood of confusion reduces the
information embodied in the A's trademark (lowers a or I or both),
which leads A to reduce its expenditures on its mark. If B's infringement is unchecked, consumer search costs will increase and A will
receive a lower price for its product and reduce its output X." Not
only does infringement injure A but, on average, consumers are also
injured because their search costs increase. B's infringement may also
harm A's image (particularly if B's product is of lower quality) and
reduce A's trademark licensing revenues, if B had licensed instead of
infringed A's mark.
Dilution is different. Although A's and B's marks are substantially
similar or even identical, consumers are not confused with respect to
source, sponsorship, affiliation, and so forth. Consumers correctly perceive that there is no connection between the two firms, notwithstanding the closeness of their marks (for example, consumers do not believe
that a chain of health clubs called "The Cadillac Body Shop" is connected in any way to General Motors or Cadillac automobiles). The two
principal injuries from dilution are blurring and tarnishment.
Blurring reduces the value of a or the productivity of the plaintiff's mark in generating information about the firm's product because
it takes consumers on average slightly more time and effort to connect
A's mark to its goods. For example, it might take consumers an extra
millisecond to realize that a radio commercial promoting Cadillac
automobiles is not a commercial for The Cadillac Body Shop. Blurring
makes it more costly for consumers to obtain information from A's
mark, which translates into a lower a or smaller savings in search
costs. Consider the lawsuit brought by Ringling Brothers against the
state of Utah that claimed the state's slogan "THE GREATEST
SNOW ON EARTH" to promote winter tourism diluted the circus's16
famous trademark slogan "THE GREATEST SHOW ON EARTH."
Even assuming that consumers understand that there is no connection
between Ringling Bros. and the state of Utah, Ringling Bros.' mark
See id.
Ringling Bros-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc v Utah Division of Travel Development, 170 F3d 449,451-52 (4th Cir 1999).
15

16
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could well provide a smaller reduction in search costs because it takes
a consumer a little more time to figure out that the Ringling Bros. advertisement is promoting the circus, not the snow in Utah.17 It is worth
noting that for blurring to take place, there must be some overlap between consumers exposed to the Ringling Bros.' advertisements and
to the state of Utah's advertisements. A rough proxy for such overlap
is that the Ringling Bros. mark is famous or at least well known
among persons exposed to the state's slogan. More formally, blurring
lowers a in equations (1) through (4) or the dollar savings in search
costs, holding constant I and T. Blurring may also have a negative impact on incremental licensing revenues (L,) if the defendant was a
potential trademark licensee. In equilibrium, blurring lowers the plaintiff's profit-maximizing expenditure on T in equation (3), raises consumer search cost and lowers the full price of the product (Po + al +
,M) as a and I fall).
Two other points about blurring are worth noting. Although blurring probably has a negligible impact on the added time and effort it
takes a single consumer to correctly associate A's mark with its good,
the aggregate cost across a large number of consumers can be substantial. A related point is that a single firm's blurring of A's mark may
only impose a slight cost on consumers, but blurring by several firms
can substantially increase overall search costs. In the limiting case,
widespread blurring can transform A's mark from a brand name to
the generic name of the product. When this happens, A will have to
invest resources in developing a new trademark. In terms of our
model, extreme blurring means that A's mark no longer provides
valuable source information (that is, al(T) = 0) or generates any image-related (/Jl(T) = 0) or licensing (L(T) = 0) revenues.

Dilution also occurs when B tarnishes A's trademark. Here B's
use of A's mark promotes an offensive or even detestable association
with A's mark. The clearest example occurs when B employs A's mark
in connection with pornography or sexually offensive material. For
example, in the adult film "Debbie Does Dallas," the star performs
sexual acts wearing a uniform "substantially similar" to the trademarked attire of a Dallas Cowboy cheerleader." The movie contained
no social commentary and potentially harmed the image (lowered
,8M(T) and L() in equation (2)) of the Dallas Cowboys and their
17 To simplify the model, we assume that blurring does not affect the firm's image M in
equation (1). We note, however, the blurring will affect the firm's image because it leads the firm
to choose a lower T. Since the firm's image M depends on the level of T, a lower T caused by
blurring will also weaken the firm's image.
18
See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders Inc v Pussycat Cinema, Ltd, 604 F2d 200, 202-03 (2d Cir
1979) (noting the scene in question and some related advertising referencing Dallas Cheerleaders).
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cheerleaders. Although the movie will not reduce the Cowboys' football revenues, it could reduce ancillary income generated by the cheerleaders. Another example of tarnishment involved Yardman's humorous advertisement that depicted John Deere's famous leaping male
deer running in fear from a Yardman tractor and a barking dog." The
purpose of the ad was to gain sales, but in the process it tarnished the
favorable associations consumers have with John Deere's mark. In
terms of equation (2), tarnishment harms A's image, which lowers
fM(T) and L(T) and eventually reduces A's profits per dollar expenditure on T. Note also that as MT and LT decline, A's equilibrium ex-

penditures on its trademark decline in equation (4). Consumers are
injured because tarnishment lowers the value (and hence consumer
surplus) they receive from A's image.
The relative impact of blurring and tarnishment on dilution will
depend on the importance of search costs relative to image in the product's price. Generally, the more important status and prestige are in creating product value (holding information constant), the more important
the firm's image will be, and the potential harm from tarnishment will
be greater relative to the harm from blurring. Thus, luxury watches,
fancy cars, designer clothing and expensive perfumes are at greater risk
from tarnishment because their prices largely depend on image-type
attributes. In contrast, blurring is likely to be of greater concern for
trademarks attached to products whose prices are largely determined
by production and distribution costs rather than image attributes.
A third possible cause of dilution, but one that is not actionable
under the Lanham Act, resembles the common law tort of misappropriation. Here the defendant uses the plaintiffs famous mark where
there is no risk of blurring or tarnishment. The plaintiff's harm arises
from losing the option to license its mark. Imagine, for example, that a
neighborhood fitness studio calls itself "Body by Tiffany." Assuming
no chance of tarnishment or blurring, if Tiffany had the legal right to
prevent the unauthorized use of its name, it might license the Tiffany
name to the fitness studio. The prospect of additional licensing revenues
will increase LT in equation (4), increase Tiffany's incentive to invest in
its already famous mark, and lead to a higher equilibrium level of T.
But as Posner explains, these extra revenues are likely to be trivial.
The validity of the rationale may be doubted, however. The number of prestigious names is so vast (and, as important, would be even if
there were no antidilution laws) that it is unlikely that the owner of a
19 See Deere & Company v MTD Products, Inc, 41 F3d 39,41 (2d Cir 1994) (describing the
symbol and the allegedly infringing advertisement).
20
Although our model separates blurring from tarnishment, there will be some cases where
blurring may also tarnish A's mark and where, at the outset, tarnishment may also blur A's mark.
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prestigious trademark could obtain substantial license fees if commercial use of the mark without his consent were forbidden21 despite the
absence of consumer confusion, blurring, or tarnishment.
The cost of licensing its trademark is another reason to doubt
that Tiffany would gain much from the license. Aside from the direct
cost of drafting the license, Tiffany would also incur the cost of monitoring compliance with the terms of the license. These costs are
probably not small because they include expenditures to ensure that
the quality of fitness services is consistent with Tiffany's image. Moreover, inadequate monitoring can be construed as a "naked license"
that results in Tiffany's losing trademark protection for its mark.
Another possible category of dilution concerns a firm that lawfully sells a knock-off of a prestigious good and uses the latter's mark22
to inform (but not confuse) consumers about the product it is selling.
Consider a mail order firm that sells a cheap perfume whose scent is
indistinguishable from Chanel No 5. Obviously, the most efficient (and
maybe the only economical) way to inform consumers of this fact is to
advertise that its scent is identical to Chanel No 5. Since it is lawful
to sell the imitation, a legal prohibition on using the Chanel mark to
provide information would probably prevent the copier from doing
what the law allows him to do; namely, sell cheap copies. From an economic standpoint, however, the copier has tarnished Chanel's mark.
The ability of Chanel and other manufacturers of luxury goods to
charge premium prices depends, in part, on their image of exclusivity
and the status of the people who buy these goods.24 As Chanel's fragrance becomes more commonplace, its prestigious image will decline,
which reduces the number of people willing to pay a premium price
for Chanel No 5. Ultimately, fashion-setters and wealthy women will
shift to alternative exclusive perfumes, which will accelerate the decline in demand and downward pressure on the Chanel's price. In
terms of our model, the sale of knock-offs will reduce the value of
con1 6M(T, z) for a given expenditure on T and lower the price that
21

Perryman,306 F3d at 512.

See, for example, Smith v Chanel, Inc, 402 F2d 562,562-63 (9th Cir 1968).
Id at 567 ("A competitor's chief weapon is his ability to represent his product as being
equivalent and cheaper. The most effective way ... in which this can be done is to identify the
copied article by its trademark or trade name.") (quotation marks omitted).
24 See Gary S.Becker, William M. Landes, and Kevin M. Murphy, The Social Market for the
GreatMasters and Other Collectibles,in Gary S. Becker and Kevin M. Murphy, Social Economics:
22
23

Market Behavior in a Social Environment 76 (Belknap 2000) ("[Tjhe demand for many classes of

collectible objects is enhanced when consumers of these objects are rich, renowned for their
achievements as entertainers, politicians, or businessmen, and even when they are notorious
scoundrels."). See also generally Shahar J. Dilbary, Famous Trademarks and the Rational Basis
for Protecting "IrrationalBeliefs", 14 Geo Mason L Rev 605 (2007) (providing a legal analysis of
the phenomenon of "snobs" who are influenced by "persuasive branding").
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sumers are willing to pay for the product. Although potential purchasers know whether they are buying Chanel No 5 or the knock-off, there
may be confusion in the personal relationship market where persons
wearing the imitation perfume will deceive others into believing they
are members of a class of well-to-do and sophisticated consumers.
This, however, is not the kind of confusion or tarnishment that trademark law seeks to eliminate.
An interesting variant of the cheap imitation problem is Esercizio
v Roberts, where Roberts sold a kit that
allowed a hobbyist to build a
26
Ferrari look-alike car for about $8,500. Although no one purchasing
a Roberts kit believed he was getting a genuine Ferrari, the appearance of Ferrari look-alikes on the road could tarnish Ferrari's image
for two reasons. First, some potential Ferrari customers and other
drivers might notice that the look-alike did not perform up to the high
standard of a Ferrari. These persons, however, will be unaware of or
discount the possibility that they are observing an imitation and not a
genuine Ferrari. Second, since there will be more Ferrari look-alikes
on the road, the exclusivity and snob-appeal of the Ferrari design will
decline, which lowers M(T). Although Ferrari's image is tarnished, it
is not clear that consumers are injured. To be sure, the product's image
has diminished, but so has its price. Moreover, wealthy and statusseeking consumers can shift to other exclusive automobiles and products. On the benefits side, people who buy knock-offs are better off,
although this may come about from deception in the personal relationship market. There is an additional problem in the case of a highstatus durable good as opposed to a perfume. Automobiles generate
services today and in future periods whereas perfume primarily generates benefits in the current period. Owners of high-status durable
goods, therefore, will suffer a capital loss on their stock of their goods
from imitations, which will tarnish the image and hence reduce the
value of the goods they own. In short, consumers are more likely to be
injured in the case of high-status durable goods than perishable goods
because the negative impact on the good's image will adversely affect
consumers who already own the durable good.
It is worth noting one other situation that is special to the internet and could fit an expanded notion of dilution. Consider the Titleist
trademark for golf equipment and balls. Only one party can use Titleist.com as its Internet name, whereas in real space many firms can
simultaneously use the Titleist mark as a product identifier provided
944 F2d 1235 (6th Cir 1991).
Id at 1238. Although the court held that Roberts had infringed Ferrari's trademarks on
the design of its automobiles, the underlying rationale for this result (as pointed out in the dissent) was that Roberts had tarnished Ferrari's image. Id at 1241-46, 1251-52.
25

26
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there is no likelihood of confusion. A domain name is a private good
in the sense that
one firm's use precludes another from using the same
27
domain name. In contrast, an ordinary trademark has a public goods
aspect to it since many firms can (in theory) use the same mark simultaneously without any firm's use preventing another firm's use. Prior
to the passage of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act in
1999,2 some people would register well-known marks as domain
names 29 and thereby preempt registration by the owner of those
marks. Known as cybersquatters, these people had no interest in exploiting the marks but instead hoped to sell or license them back to
the firms that owned the marks in physical space. If negotiations
failed, litigation might result in which the original trademark owner
claimed dilution on the theory that the defendant's registration of the
domain name lessened the capacity of the trademark holder to identify and distinguish its goods on the Internet.30 This is a form of blurring because consumers would have to take more time and effort to
connect the plaintiffs name to its website since the most obvious
name was already taken by the cybersquatter. There is also the possibility of tarnishment because consumers might be directed to pornographic or other sites that injured the plaintiffs image. Tarnishment,
however, would be rare because cybersquatters were banking the
trademark, not using it for a commercial purchase.
II. SECOND-HAND GOODS, TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT,
AND DILUTION

Beanie Babies are collectable items like art, coins, stamps, comic
books, beer bottles, Star Wars action figures and so forth. A wellfunctioning second-hand market in collectibles depends on the availability to buyers and sellers of information on the types, condition and
prices of products available, the terms of sale, the location of sellers
and other relevant attributes of the products. In the case of Ty's Beanies, this requires that the many second-hand dealers let potential customers know they are selling Beanies or Beanie Babies and, in addition, provide information on the type of Beanie (for example, Batty
the Bat, Princess Bear, or Halo the Angel), its age, and its condition. If
a firm has substantial Internet sales, the most efficient way to provide
27
This is a slight exaggeration because the number of top level domain names is expandable-so a company could use, for example, titleist.biz if titleist.com were already taken.
28
Pub L No 106-113,113 Stat 1356 (1999).
29
One such cybersquatter, Dennis Toeppen, registered over one hundred well-known
business names such as Delta Airlines, Neiman-Marcus, Ramada Inn and U.S. Steel. See Panavision International,LP v Toeppen, 141 F3d 1316,1318-19 (9th Cir 1998).
30
See id at 1324-27.
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this information may include using the Beanie term as part of its business or domain name. As Posner explains:
[The secondary] market is unlikely to operate efficiently if sellers
who specialize in serving it cannot use "Beanies" to identify their
business. Perryman's principal merchandise is Beanie Babies, so
that to forbid it to use "Beanies" in its business name and advertising (Web or otherwise) is like forbidding a used car dealer who
specializes31 in selling Chevrolets to mention the name in his advertising.
Might a seller of second-hand goods like Perryman who disclaims
any affiliation with the original manufacturer, infringe or dilute the
trademark of the original manufacturer? Posner thinks not.
"Perryman is not a competing producer of beanbag stuffed animals,
and her Web site clearly disclaims any affiliation with Ty."
Dilution fares no better in Posner's view:
Supposing that Perryman sold only Beanie Babies (a potentially
relevant qualification, as we'll see), we would find it impossible to
understand how she could be thought to be blurring, tarnishing,
or otherwise free riding to any significant extent on Ty's investment in its mark.
In Perryman's case, Posner is clearly right. Since she is entitled to
resell Beanies, she must be allowed to advertise that fact provided she
does not claim that she is affiliated with or connected to Ty. But it does
not follow that a reseller of Beanies in all circumstances should be
allowed to use the Beanie mark in her advertising or business name.
There are circumstances where such use would be socially harmful.
Consider the following variation of Perryman's situation.
Suppose a fire or flood has severely damaged a large number of
Beanies in Perryman's inventory. The damage includes tattered costumes, faces that are no longer recognizable and even limbs that have
been torn from their bodies and destroyed. Assume further that the
Beanies are sufficiently rare and valuable to make restoration worthwhile. In some cases, Perryman is able to work with the designation in
both her business name and promotional material original materials;
in other cases, she essentially starts from scratch but closely follows
the original design. The end result is a restored Beanie that an expert
cannot distinguish from a brand new one. Perryman promotes her
goods as "restored and repaired authentic Beanies" in "like-new"
31
32
33

Perryman, 306 F3d at 512.
Id at 510-11.
Id at 512.
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condition, and offers them at prices comparable to second-hand Beanies that have never been repaired. Perryman calls her business "Bargain Beanies" but disclaims any connection to Ty and provides on request a detailed description of her restoration work. In these circumstances, does Perryman risk infringing or diluting the Beanies' mark
by naming her firm "Bargain Beanies" and designating her goods as
"authentic" and "restored Beanies"? Stated differently, can the extent
of repair be so great that Perryman is no longer selling an authentic
Beanie but a lower quality and possibly different product altogether?
And at that point, Perryman would be no different than a producer of
Beanie look-alikes who tried to pass off its goods as genuine Ty
Beanie Babies.14
A.

Trademark Infringement

Consider two groups of consumers. Group A consumers are not
confused by Perryman's use of the Beanie mark. They understand
fully the extent of Perryman's restoration and that she has no connection to Ty. At the same time, the Beanies confuse another group of
consumers (group B) notwithstanding Perryman's disclaimer. Some
group B consumers may mistakenly believe that Perryman is a subsidiary of Ty or that Ty itself has restored.the Beanies or authorized,
sponsored or approved the restoration. Others in group B may significantly underestimate the extent of the restoration. For example, they
might believe that restoration only involves minor sewing repairs and
cleaning but not replacing damaged limbs and clothing. In short, mistaken beliefs could confuse and (as we show below) materially injure
some consumers resulting in more harm than gain from letting
Perryman use the Beanie mark to indicate a Ty product. Typically,
however, this issue can be dealt with by requiring greater detail and
clarity in the disclaimer not by removing the Beanie name.
Assume that new Ty Beanies sell for $12; second-hand ones in
like-new condition for $10; and non-Ty Beanie look-alikes or knockoffs (which do not use the Beanie trademark) for $6. Assume further
that Perryman has 100 restored Beanies for sale at a price of $10-the
same price as the second-hand ones above. Suppose there are 1,000
customers (800 in group A and 200 in group B) currently in the market for second-hand Beanies. Persons in group A (the well-informed
34 The law, however, would permit the producer to use Beanies in a descriptive sense to
inform consumers that it is selling a Beanie look-alike. (The Lanham Act lists a descriptive use of
a mark as one of the defenses against infringement (§ 33(b)(4), codified at 15 USC § 1115(b)(4))
and dilution (§ 43(c)(3)(A), Pub L No 109-312, 120 Stat at 1731, to be codified at 15 USC
§ 1125(c)(3)(A)).
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group) are willing to pay a maximum of $6.00 for one of Perryman's
restored Beanies because they view her product as equivalent to a
Beanie look-alike without the Beanie trademark. In contrast, persons
in group B (the misinformed group) are willing to pay up to $10.00
each for Perryman Beanies because they view them as perfect substitutes for pristine second-hand Beanies that have never been damaged.
Given these assumptions, Perryman has no trouble selling all 100 restored Beanies to group B consumers at a $10 price. Suppose that over
time, however, the 200 group B consumers acquire more accurate information about Perryman's extensive restoration and revise downward their valuations to $6-the same value of a Beanie knock-off
without the Beanie mark. At this point, group A and B consumers
have identical valuations and the resale price of Perryman's restored
Beanies in the collectibles market plunges 40 percent to $6. Given
these facts, has Perryman infringed the Beanie trademark by identifying her product as an authentic restored Beanie?
To be sure, consumers have lost $400 (100 times the $4 price decline) which they would have avoided if they had known earlier what
they know now. Moreover, this is a real social loss, not a transfer, because the total value of Beanie collectibles has declined by $400. What
is less clear, however, is whether Perryman's use of the Beanie mark
caused this injury. The answer is probably "yes." Group B consumers
misinterpreted the combination of the Beanie mark in Perryman's
business name and advertising, the term "authentic," the extent of the
restoration, and her no affiliation disclaimer. As these consumers
learned more about the true nature of Perryman's goods, they revised
downward their valuations of her "Beanies" until they were worth no
more than the $6 or the market price of knock-offs without the
Beanie mark. We also know that the Beanie trademark is worth $6
because a new Ty Beanie sells for $12 and a knock-off sells for $6.
Since the Ty Beanie and the knock-off are (by assumption) identical in
all observable characteristics, the Beanie trademark is worth $6 because it indirectly provides information on the high quality, prestige,
and prior positive experiences of owning an original Ty Beanie.
Perryman's calling her firm "Bargain Beanies" and claiming that her
products are authentic Beanies is just like a manufacturer deceptively
claiming his knock-offs or fakes are authentic Ty Beanies. The fake
would initially sell for around $12, but once the fraud was exposed its
price would fall to $6. Similarly, when Perryman passes off her product
as an authentic Beanie in like-new condition, she can charge a $4 premium above the price of a knock-off (equal to $6 for the value of the
Beanie mark minus $2 for the fact that a new Ty Beanie sells for $12
and a used one in like-new condition sells for $10). In short, if
Perryman were not permitted to use the Beanie trademark, consum-
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ers would avoid a $400 capital loss and would have greater confidence
that the Beanie mark indicates
an authentic Ty product that has not
35
been extensively repaired.
This, however, is not the end of the story. Consider the following
possibility: Perryman continues to use the Beanie mark but provides a
clearer description of her restoration (for example, she prominently
discloses in her advertising that she has extensively restored and repaired the damaged Beanies) and deletes the term "authentic" from
her promotional material. Suppose that Perryman makes these
changes at a cost of $50 (or $.50 per restored Beanie), and as a result
150 of the 200 consumers in group B (the group misled earlier) now
understand the true nature of Perryman's restoration and that she has
no connection to Ty. In effect, these 150 consumers are now part of
group A (the informed group). There are still fifty persons in group B
who continue to be misled by Perryman's use of the Beanie mark, but
since Perryman has 100 to sell, she can only clear the market by cutting her price to $6 in order to induce fifty persons in group A (or fifty
in A who were formerly in B) to purchase her product. At this point,
Perryman's deletion of the term "authentic" and her clearer disclaimer (at a cost of $50) eliminates the $400 harm to consumersindeed, there may be some small gain from Perryman retaining the
Beanie mark because it lowers the search cost of consumers who have
a slight preference for a Perryman Beanie (with the Beanie mark)
than a knock-off without the Beanie mark.
On the other hand, if Perryman's changes induce only fifty, not
150, B's to change their views of Perryman's product, then Perryman
will still be able to sell all her restored Beanies at a $10 price. Assuming the 150 Bs who were misled initially eventually understand the full
nature of Perryman's activity, the price will again fall to $6 and cause a
social harm of $400. In this case, there is no gain to consumers from
the additional $50 Perryman spends on her disclaimer and the more
efficient solution would be to hold her liable for trademark infringement and require her to remove the Beanie mark.

35 An additional complication that strengthens the argument for removing the Beanie
mark from Perryman's goods is that group B consumers may take account of the probability that
the market will eventually view a second-hand Perryman Beanie as equivalent to a knock-off.
This will lead them to discount the price they are willing to pay for a Perryman Beanie at the
outset. At the same time, it may cause them to discount the price of other used Beanies sold by
retailers because they have no reason to believe that one sold by Perryman is different from one
sold by another retailer. In effect, Perryman's has reduced the implicit value of the Beanie mark
to other firms that sell second-hand that had not been severely damaged and then restored.
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Dilution

In addressing the question of dilution, we assume that consumers
in both groups A and B understand the full nature of Perryman's repairs and restoration and her lack of any connection to Ty. Although
Perryman uses the Beanie mark to identify her product and business,
there is no consumer confusion and hence no trademark infringement.
At the outset, Perryman's restored Beanies sell for $6 (the same price
as a knock-off without the Beanie mark) and there are no subsequent
downward price revisions because consumers are already fully informed. Given these assumptions, can Perryman's actions blur or tarnish the Beanie mark?
Blurring is a remote possibility. One might claim that Perryman's
use of the Beanie mark causes potential purchasers of Beanies to
spend a little more time and effort to figure out whether the term
Beanie refers to a new or a second-hand Beanie that had never been
restored or a Perryman Beanie. Conceivably, this might reduce the
productivity of Ty's advertising and promotion expenditures and increase consumer search costs. There is an offset, however, in another
dimension of search costs: namely, the costs to consumers of distinguishing between a Perryman Beanie and a knock-off that does not
use the Beanie mark. When Perryman uses the Beanie mark, these
costs would be lower than when she removes the mark. In the latter
situation, some consumers would incur the added search costs trying
to figure out whether a product is a knock-off or a Perryman Beanie.
Tarnishment seems even less likely than blurring. Consider the following example. Suppose a Perryman Beanie does not perform as well
as a second-hand Beanie that never required any restoration. For example, a Perryman Beanie may be more likely to lose its shape or leak
pellets or more likely to deteriorate over time than other second-hand
Beanies. Would this tarnish Ty's image? Not likely, because consumers
probably expect Perryman's Beanies to be of lower quality since they
sell for 40 percent less ($6 compared to $10) than undamaged Beanies.
Two related points are worth noting. The first one starts with the
(unlikely) assumption that a Ty Beanie is a prestigious and exclusive
good whose image might be tarnished by a large number of cheap
imitations or knock-offs. Since a Perryman Beanie is like a knock-off
(as indicated by their identical prices of $6), the more Perryman Bean36 It might appear that there are no consumer benefits from distinguishing between a
Perryman Beanie and a knock-off given our assumption that both sell for the same price ($6).
This ignores the potential gain to inframarginal consumers who value the Perryman's goods at
more than $6. The source of this gain is the value some consumers attach to the fact that
Perryman's goods are a mixture of a Ty Beanie and non-Ty replacement parts.
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ies there are in the marketplace, the less exclusive the Beanie mark
and the lower the price that consumers would be willing to pay for a
new Ty Beanie. In this example, Beanies are like Porsche automobiles
or designer clothes in that the willingness of consumers to pay high
prices for these goods is compromised by a large number of cheap
imitations. The harm to Ty's image, however, results from the large
number of cheap imitations and knock-offs, not Perryman's use of the
Beanie mark. Even if Perryman removed the Beanie mark, her goods
would still add to the number of knock-offs. Hence tarnishment depends on the number of goods Perryman sells, not on whether they
are marketed under the Beanie name.
The second and more plausible case for tarnishment arises because of subsequent resales of Perryman's Beanies. Although direct
purchasers of Perryman's Beanies are, by assumption, fully informed
about Perryman's repairs, persons who subsequently acquire these
Beanies will probably not have this information. If it turns out that
Perryman's Beanies are in fact less durable, this can tarnish Ty's image.
There is no reason, however, to expect Perryman's Beanies to be less
durable than a second-hand Beanie that has not been restored. Indeed, the opposite is more likely to be true since Perryman's Beanies
have already undergone significant restoration that experts have
praised.
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